

these policies have, in the past, too often been guided by *realpolitik* alliances with non-democratic forces. That has made Western democracies open to charges of double standards. Counter-narratives which are backed by deeds that give credence to them are bound to be perceived as hypocritical and might in the e do more harm than good. Western democracies have to be both forceful and careful in what they say a how they say it in their Counter-Narratives to the Single Narrative of the transnational jihadist movement spearheaded by al-Qaeda.

A discussion on such issues took place under the heading *Counter-narratives and the Performative Power of Counter-Terrorism* in the Netherlands on June 4-5, 2009. This International Expert Meeting was held under the auspices of the Leiden University's Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) and the British and Canadian embassies in The Hague. The Editor of *Perspectives on Terrorism* attended this meeting and asked four of the forty speakers and participants for their views on the matter. The current issue of *Perspectives on Terrorism* contains their contributions. A publication on the entire proceedings of that International Expert Meeting is under preparation by the NCTb and will be available in early 2010.

Sincerely,

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Counter-Narratives and the Unrehearsed Stories

partisans and vandals', as many officials within the BKA, the security apparatus and the conservative parties (CDU & CSU) were eager to do. Rather than looking for support for his approach with the conservative hardliners, Schmidt stressed the value of the 'Gemeinsamkeit der Demokraten' ('communality of democrats'). His main concern - and the message he wanted to spread - referred to the protection of democracy and the rule of law. He therefore rigorously rejected all unconstitutional proposals that were made. While over 67 % of the population demanded the introduction of the death penalty, he refused to submit to such pressure. There were even more radical proposals, e.g. a police union proposing to issue rewards of 50.000 German Marks for anyone who killed a terrorist.[6] Others, such as the Bavarian president of the CSU, Franz-Josef Strauss, even called for reprisals against RAF prisoners and their relatives. 'Not with me', was Helmut Schmidt's response to such proposals. He thought such emergency measures would result in 'morally cracking the people'.[7]

Schmidt consciously invoked the concept of a 'militant democracy', as elaborated by Karl Loewenstein and Karl Mannheim, a concept that was in line with a ruling of the West-German Constitutional Court.[8] By using such a framework, the Chancellor was able to indicate that the German Federal Republic was not involved in a battle of the revolutionary Left against a (neo-) Fascist Right, as the RAF suggested, but instead suffered an attack on the liberal democratic order, prompted by a marginal group of terrorists. All parties were targets and therefore all were required to repel these attacks collectively.[9]

This counter-narrative concept entailed the idea that the German Federal Republic was a constitutional democracy, that it had (and should have) the necessary power to combat any (perceived) threats to the

terrorism alive. [33]

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NOTES:

[1] Based on the forthcoming study: Beatrice de Graaf, Strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Amerika en Italië (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009). English translation to be published in 2010 under the title: Counterterrorism as Performance. The Presentation and Perception of Counterterrorism in the Netherlands, Germany, the United States and Italy.

[2] Cf. Butz Peters, Tödlicher Irrtum. Die Geschichte der RAF, Berlin 2004; Stefan Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex. Hamburg 2008.

[3] See Matthias Dahlke, Der Anschlag auf Olympia '72. Die politischen Reaktionen auf den internationalen Terrorismus in Deutschland. München, 2006, pp. 25-27; Klaus Weinhauer, ´Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik der Siebzigerjahre', in: Beatrix Bouvier et al., Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Vol. 44 (Bonn, 2004), p. 225; Cf. Matthias Dahlke, 'Der blinde Fleck. Transnationaler und nationaler Terrorismus auf dem Weg zum "Deutschen Herbst"'; in: Jan-Holger Kirsch/Annette Vowinckel (Eds.), Zeitgeschichte-online, Thema: Die RAF als Geschichte und Gegenwart, Mai 2007, p. 8. URL: http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/zol/portals/_rainbow/documents/pdf/raf/dahlke_dbf.pdf (September 2008).

[4] Klaus Weinhauer, 'Zwischen Partisanenkampf und „Kommissar Computer". Polizei und Linksterrorismus in der Bundesrepublik bis Anfang der 1980er Jahre', in: Jörg Weinhauer et al (Eds.), Der linke Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik. Frankfurt am Main, 2006, pp. 244-270.

[5] Cf. Matthias Dahlke, '"Nur eingeschränkte Krisenbereitschaft". Die staatliche Reaktion auf die Entführung des CDU-Politikers Peter Lorenz 1975', in: Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte (2007) No. 4, pp. 641-678; Michael Mäder, Die Machtprobe 1975. Wie RAF und Bewegung 2. Juni den Staat erpressten. Leipzig, 2007.

[6] Dahlke, "Nur eingeschränkte Krisenbereitschaft", op. Cit., p. 654.

[7] Georg Bönisch, Klaus Wiegrefe, „Massive Gegendrohung", in: Der Spiegel, No.. 37/2008, pp. 48-53.

[8] Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time. Wartime Essays of a Sociologist. London, 1943; K>BD35 a(een.,)-21 Mitisan

[23]For an overview of developments during the 'Deutscher Herbst' [„German Autumn"], see Stefan Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex. München, Goldmann Verlag, 2008; Peter Brandt, Tödlicher Irrtum. Die Geschichte der RAF. Berlin, Argon, 2004.

[24]See Rudolf Wassermann, ‚Sicherung oder Aushöhlung des Rechtsstaates?', in: J. Augstein et al., Terrorismus contra Rechts-staat. Darmstadt/Neuwied, Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1976, pp. 125-162.

[25]See, for example, A. Lehning, H. Wielek and P.H. Bakker Schut, Duitsland: voorbeeld of waarschuwing? West-Duitsland een politiestaat, of "de geschiedenis herhaalt zich" [Germany: example or warning? West Germany a police state, or "history repeating itself"]. Baarn, Wereldvenster, 1976.

[26]Cit. in: Weinhauer, ‚Zwischen „Partisanenkampf" und „Kommissar Computer"', p. 262.

[27]The interview was published in Der Spiegel (Hamburg), No. 53/1979. For the extended version, see Axel Jeschke and Wolfgang Malanowski (Eds.), Der Minister und der Terrorist – Gespräche zwischen Gerhart Baum und Horst Mahler. Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1980.

[28]The compilation by the Federal Ministry oft he Interior [Bundesministerium des Innern] (Ed.), Hat sich die Republik verändert? Terrorismus im Spiegel der Presse

Terrorist Drop-outs: One Way of Promoting a Counter-Narrative

by Michael Jacobson

Abstract

The answer to the question whose voice is most effective in terms of delivering a counter-narrative to al-Qaeda's Single Narrative depends on which audience one wants to reach. Arguably, the terrorists themselves (as opposed to segments of their envisaged constituency) are the most difficult audience to reach. However, there is one group that might have special credibility with them – former terrorists. This article explores, by way of examples, how former terrorists and extremists could contribute to reducing terrorist violence.

As the United States continues to fight militarily to disrupt the efforts of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the U.S. government has slowly come to the realization that military force alone cannot defeat radical extremism. Countering the ideology that drives this extremism has become a critical element in the effort to prevent and defeat the violence that emerges from it. Focusing on the "softer" side of counterterrorism has become a new and necessary approach of U.S. and its allies alike. One of the main foci in this new battle is the recognition of the importance of the so-called "battle of ideas." Al-Qaeda's ideas and those of like-minded groups must be challenged with a counter-narrative of stronger appeal.

As the United States and other parties have attempted to begin crafting their own narrative to counter that of radical groups in this "battle of ideas," it has become clear that in order to develop an effective message, it is necessary to better understand the radicalization process itself for the factors that cause people to choose this path must be properly understood. If this is not the case, it will be impossible to figure out which messages will resonate among terrorist recruits and which might be effective to counter the radicalization process.

An examination of the reasons why, and the processes by, which individuals are radicalized, has made clear that, as one British government official stated "there is no single path that leads people to violent extremism." The same official noted that "social, foreign policy, economic, and personal factors all lead people to throw their lot in with extremists." Consequently, there might also be more than one 'single narrative' to persuade an individual to join the extremist cause. While al-Qaeda employs a global narrative centered on the West being at war with Islam, Hamas and Hizballah have different narratives to build their following – narratives that rely heavily on their track record of providing needed support to local populations.

As the U.S. has begun to focus on the softer side of counterterrorism, there has been a great deal of attention paid to what a counter-narrative may do to try to prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place. However, an effective counter-narrative will need to address not only those vulnerable to the extremist message, but also those on the path toward radicalization, and those already radicalized. It is clear that the U.S. government and others cannot develop a single, overarching counter-narrative that can be expected to work across the board.

In order to determine what counter-narrative might be effective among those apparently hardened individuals already incorporated in terrorist organizations or those well along the path to radicalization, it is

later questioned a bin Laden fatwa in 2000, which said that killing Americans and Jews everywhere is the highest of act of worship and good deeds. He alone among the JI commanders refused to carry out an ordered attack. His view was that jihad was to be fought only on the battlefield in defense of Islam as he had always been taught that the killing of civilians had nothing to do with "holy war."

Abbas felt that his fellow members in JI had an incorrect understanding of the JI mission. Jihad, to Abbas, was warranted in Afghanistan and the Philippines, countries facing an enemy attacking a Muslim community. Since he dropped out of JI, Abbas has turned against the organization and has been cooperating with the Indonesian government and even testifying against the group's leadership.

Interestingly, Abbas did not think that attacking a repressive government was wrong; his qualms with JI and other terrorist organizations' actions extended only to their use of violence against civilians. In his own words: "I couldn't understand that exploding bombs against innocent civilians was jihad. That was the difference that made me escape from the group." Abbas' cooperation with the Indonesian governme and his public criticism of his former organization has been invaluable.

In the same way, and for similar reasons, al-Ridi began assisting the US government, explaining that he wanted to cooperate because "I told them I have an interest in helping you because I think Osama has ruined the reputation of Muslims." A counter-narrative that emphasizes the terrorist groups' hypocrisy might resonate with those having similar doubts in terrorist organizations.

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his followers to cut back on their spending. He felt that bin Laden—a notoriously rich Saudi—was being stingy.

A counter-narrative should also focus on the fear factor and make graphically clear why an individual should be afraid to be a suicide bomber. Given the fact that some have abandoned a planned attack eve at the last minute, a fear-awareness approach could have some impact. This factor appears to have bee signiÞcant in the case of Sajid Badat, a British citizen who was trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan to serve as the other "shoebomber." In a letter he had sent earlier to his parents he spoke of his "sincere d sire to sell my soul to Allah in return for Paradise." Later, he dropped out because, as he told prosecutor he wanted to "introduce some calm to his life."

Mohammed al-Owaß ed the scene of the 1998 embassy bombing in Nairobi before he could carry out what was supposed to be another component of the suicide attacks. While he did not drop out of al-Qae da, his ßeeing from the scene is significant in considering what could be done in influencing those who do not follow through on their assignments to commit suicide attacks. In the failed July 21, 2005, attacks in London, one of the bombers, Manfo Kwaku Asiedu, a 32-year old British Ghanian, abandoned his bomb in a West London park. While not much is known about him at this point, it can be presumed that fear was an important factor in this last-minute decision.

Another important element for governments to consider is the fact that they are not always the most ef- fective messengers for the counter-narrative. There is certainly a role for the US government and other governments to play. There are many cases, however, where other actors may make more effective mes sengers than governments.

Former terrorists and extremists are one obvious party to consider when it comes to transmitting counter narrative messages. Their messages would resonate particularly strongly compared to that of unknown government oÞ

[5]Dr. Fadl, also known as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, was born in Egypt and later met Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's "No. 2," after attending Cairo University for medical studies. He later led the former Egyptian Islamic Jihad and wrote both a field guide for jihadis as well as an extensive account of what is required of a perfect Muslim. He severed ties with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1994 after a disagreement with al-Zawahiri, and was, after 9/11, imprisoned. Since 2004 he is serving a life sentence in Egypt.

his assassination but it most likely was an internal operation ordered by Ayman al Zawahiri or Bin Laden himself). In addition to his work on Join the Caravan[4] Abdullah Azzam also made an important statement concerning what he viewed to be the mission of the future:

" Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology. It carves the all along the sheer endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifest itself. This vanguard constitutes Al Qa'idah al-Sulhah for the expected society."[5]

2. Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places By Osama bin Laden. This article was published in the open press in London (UK) in August 1996. It appeared originan

beliefs before he was arrested. During the course of legal proceedings against him, six of the eight themes emerged in name while a seventh (Al-Wala Wal Bara) appeared in all but name only.

The eight themes that appear on a regular basis in jihadist discourse are: Jihad, Bayat, Daru Islam, Ummah, Takfir, Shaheed, Al-Wala Wal Bara, and Hijrah. Each of the eight themes/terms has two major interpretations, that of al-Qaeda and/or its followers and a more classical, mainstream interpretation of the concept. It is instructive to juxtapose how each term is perceived by al-Qaeda adherents as opposed to how each term is used by mainstream scholars.[15]

Jihad or Struggle (al-Qaeda's View)

Jihad is war, according to al-Qaeda's perspective. It is an obligatory act for all Muslims. This obligation is described as being "fardh ain". Permission from parents or other relatives is not required if the jihadist is of an age of understanding. The aim of jihad is to achieve Muslim dominance over Daru Islam. Armed jihad is the highest form of jihad and should be undertaken against all enemies of Islam. This includes, Judeo-Christians, polytheists, as well as those who support them.

Jihad or Struggle (Islamic Scholars' View)

According to mainstram Islamic scholars, the concept of jihad refers to 'striving for excellence'. There are multiple goals for jihad. Among them are jihad for goodness (al khair), human development, prosperity, education, family, friendship and nation-building. There is also jihad against the human condition as well. This includes jihad against evil (asy-syarr), one's inner self, and intrusions upon one's laziness, stupidity, hatred and arrogance.

Bayat or Pledge (al-Qaeda's View)

A bayat is a pledge of obedience given to the Emir or leader of a group. The bayat to the leader of the group is the same that one would give to the Prophet Mohammed. Once a bayat is given, it cannot be broken. Anyone who breaks the pledge is guilty of an exceptionally grave sin. One who does so is not only guilty of sin but then becomes kafir (non-believer) as well. If you have not made a bayat, you can be considered less pious and less Muslim than those who have.

Bayat (Islamic Scholars' View)

The status of the permissibility of a bayat must be ascertained by the majority of the leaders of society, i.e. the ulama (scholars), umara (rulers) and other respected people. It cannot be decided by just one self-appointed leader. The Emir of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, does not represent the majority of the Muslim community or its leaders. Therefore, he does not have the authority to take a bayat from anyone. The al-Qaeda interpretation of bayat is invalid and does not carry any religious weight.

Daru Islam (al-Qaeda's View)

The concept of Daru Islam or an 'Islamic state' is a constant theme within al-Qaeda's propaganda. It holds that in order to establish the religion, it is first necessary to establish an Islamic state, which, in turn, will then lead to the re-establishment of the Caliphate (Khilafah Islamiyah). It is obligatory for all Muslims to contribute both financially and physically to this end.

Daru Islam (Islamic Scholars' View)

Islamic scholars believe that the term Daru Islam is a relative term. It does not have a precise or exact meaning. There are no clear injunctions towards Daru Islam. Therefore, the justification of killing or spilling blood to achieve this vague notion is considered dangerous.

The Ummah (al-Qaeda's View)

The Ummah is the collective community of all Muslims. The rules for the Ummah are those of the "rightful way." Anyone who follows the "rightful way" is a member of the chosen community. Anyone who does not believe or follow the rules is a non-believer. Every Muslim must follow the Ummah, but if the states in which they live are run by non-believers, Muslims do not have to follow the laws of those states.

The Ummah (Islamic Scholars' View)

No one can claim that their community is the "one and only" true community. There is no single authority in Islam that can make such a declaration; that would be an expression of arrogance. Islam encourages the creation of Brotherhood (Ukhuwwah) among all Muslims. Within Islam there is the Medina Charter, which believes that there must be peaceful co-existence among Muslims, Jews and Christians. Islam also advocates that a good Muslim should be a good citizen as well.

Takfir (al-Qaeda's View)

Takfir is the action of accusing others of being infidels or non-believers. This is considered a very serious act. Al-Qaeda, however, has regularly employed the term in an attempt to discredit or disparage other Muslims who oppose them. By doing so, fellow Muslims are now turned into enemies.

Takfir (Islamic Scholars' View)

Muslims are forbidden to declare others to be takfir. If a Muslim does this, then that individual casts an infidelity upon him- or herself.

Shaheed or Istisyhad (al-Qaeda's View)

Al-Qaeda advocates becoming a shaheed or 'martyr' by the act of suicide bombing. This ultimate sacrifice (suicide act) is part of their hirja or migration to God. They believe that they will be rewarded in heaven for this action.

Shaheed or Istisyhad (Islamic Scholars' View)

Suicide is an act that is strongly forbidden in the Qur'an and the Hadditth. Allah has granted you a body. Only Allah can decide when the body will be taken back. There are no justifications for exceptions to this rule. Lives, be they human or others, are sacred, and must be honoured. Whoever commits suicide will be considered eternally committed to hell. Once in hell, the individual will spend the rest of eternity dying again and again in the same way they committed suicide. Therefore, suicide bombers will spend the rest of eternity having their arms, legs and head pulled off.

Al-Wala' Wal Bara' (al-Qaeda's View)

beings are creatures of God and we therefore must show respect to each other. This implies a multi-racial multi-religious society. Islam must be seen as a Rahmah (Blessing) to the Universe.

Hijrah or Migration (al-Qaeda's View)

According to the al-Qaeda view of Hijrah, volunteers should leave their homes, properties, jobs and families for the sake of God. They do not need permission from their families to do this. Al-Qaeda also advocates that they should disregard the needs of their parents, wives and children for the sake of their struggle. The believe that the volunteers should migrate (Hijrah) from worldly inclinations to heavenly goals. They can achieve this heavenly goal and obtain beautiful virgins through suicide bombings.

Hijrah or Migration (Islamic Scholars' View)

The concept of Migration (Hijrah) relates to the spirit of continuous life-long progress, opportunity and change. In classical Islam, those who would migrate must also take into consideration their family. Parents and children must be taken care of before Hijrah can be considered. A physical migration should only be considered in a dire situation when one fears for one's religious freedom, personal rights, dignity and weal Muslims should be able to prosper in their birthplace as a sign of thankfulness to God. It is even compulso for a Muslim to remain in his country when he can enhance the progress of the Muslim community in that country.

What is a Story or Narrative?

Terrorists at all levels in al-Qaeda, from the leaders of organizations down to the inspired home-grown jiha ists tell stories. These stories, or narratives, are used to reinforce their views on global grievances, recruit new members, justify their own actions, and develop new ideas on organization and tactics. Terrorist ex- tremists also use narrative stories to maintain group cohesion, especially among smaller groups or cells th operate in isolation.

Much has been written about what constitutes a story or a narrative. It is not the intent of this article to ent into that debate. In general terms, however, it can be said that a narrative must have a beginning point, a middle part and an end. The beginning is the set-up for the narrative or recalls a grievance or dif- ation. The middle part then must have a hero or agent or potential solution to the problems. The end of th

Countering the Terrorist Narratives

Many observers and leaders in the West are not even aware of the types of various competing narratives that are being told. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia provides an interesting example. To many government leaders and citizens in the West, the narratives they hear are about peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and conflict intervention. For many followers of the al-Qaeda ideology, this conflict there is lumped together with Chechnya and Kashmir. The narratives they tell are about oppression of Muslims, which is either portrayed as being ignored by the West (Chechnya) or worse still, carried out by the West (ex-Yugoslavia).

To counter such narratives, it is critical to know which aspects of al-Qaeda's ideological appeals are working. As has been demonstrated in both extensive empirical research and first-hand experience in investigations and convictions, these themes and concepts are persistently recurring. The ideology as outlined above and the eight recurring themes are therefore key areas that need to be addressed.

Tom Quiggin is a Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Study at Carleton University.

NOTES:

[1]The author was directly involved in the investigation and conviction of Momin Khawaja on terrorism charges. This case was known in Canada as Operation Awaken and in the UK as Operation Crevice. The author testified twice in the proceedings and was qualified as a court expert during this testimony. The author has also been an expert in National Security Certificate cases in control order cases in the Federal Court of Canada.

[2]In this context, "influential" should be taken to mean works that have been quoted or used by those who have taken the

Winning the Battle but Losing the War?

Narrative and Counter-Narratives Strategy

by Christian Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley

Our enemies have skilfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but for the most part we, our country, our government, has not adapted. Consider that the violent extremists have established med relations committees – these are terrorists and they have media relations committees that meet and ta about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They've proven to be highly successful at manipulat-

importance of this narrative in radicalizing individuals and groups to acts of violence, and conclude with some suggestions about how best to counter the jihadist narrative.

What is the Jihadist Narrative?

Narratives are essentially "compelling storylines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn":[6] Critical theorists like Richard Jackson contend that in the case of the "war on terror", the US narrative is a deliberately constructed discourse that has had the ultimate effect of normalizing counter-terrorism policy, empower political elites, marginalize public dissent and enforce national unity. Indeed, the current American discourse on the 'war on terror' has been so successful, he claims, that it has become embedded in the institutions of law enforcement, national security, the legal system and the legislative and executive processes. [7]

In a similar vein, Michael Vlahos surmises:

> "In war, narrative is much more than just a story. 'Narrative' may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the foundation of all strategy, upon which all else – policy, rhetoric and action – is built. War narratives need to be identified and critically examined on their own terms, for they can illuminate the inner nature of the war itself. War narrative does three essential things. First, it is the organizing framework for policy. Policy cannot exist without an interlocking foundation of 'truths' that people easily accept because they appear to be self-evident and undeniable. Second, this 'story' works as a framework precisely because it represents just such an existential vision. The 'truths' that it asserts are culturally impossible to disassemble or even criticize. Third, having presented a war logic that is beyond dispute, the narrative then serves practically as the anointed rhetorical handbook for how the war is to be argued and described." [8]

Insightful as this statement is, Vlahos commits a pivotal error: it is culturally possible to disassemble or criticize truths. Otherwise, constructing counter-narratives would be a futile exercise. The issue is not whether they can be disassembled or criticized but, rather, how it is being done, the response which the current approach to a counter-narrative is eliciting, and what follows from the analysis for the purpose of counter-narrative strategy.

The greater the traction of the jihadist narrative, the more democracies will have to rely on government intervention in the form of security and intelligence activities that are bound to curtail the freedom of all. To safeguard the freedom of their societies and citizens, the democratic narrative of freedom, equality, and justice must succeed at the same time that the jihadist narrative fails. Anti- and counter-democratic narratives threaten the values and way of life that democracies prize.

What exactly is the narrative that we are looking to counter? The many propositions about radicalization notwithstanding, the eschatological narrative remains the same: "The West is engaged in a millennial battle against Islam and Muslims must defend themselves – Islam is under attack and Muslims have an obligation to rise to its defence."[9] David Betts offers a more meticulous deconstruction of the narrative:

(1) Islam is under general unjust attack by Western crusaders led by the United States;
(2) Jihadis, whom the West refers to as "terrorists," are defending against this attack;
(3) the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportionally just and religiously sanctioned, and, therefore
(4) it is the duty of good Muslims to support these actions.[10]

This narrative advocates a "global jihad" and its potency "is rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power."[11] The narrative is strategic insofar as (i) it does not arise spontaneously but is deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current, thereby expressing a sense of identity

infer that at least some of them were inclined to answer "just" but opted not to identify themselves as such in a public poll. Assuming that there are about one million adult Muslims in the UK, 5 percent works out to 50,000 Muslims.

Of course, not all those justifiers would commit violence. In the next section we try to give some indications of how few Muslims in Europe are actually participating in jihad.

Who are the Jihadists in Europe and North America?

Security forces everywhere are looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. From a recent investigation into the Istanbul bombings,[20] we know that there was a circle of about 400 people who were aware of what was going to happen but did nothing to stop it.[21] In such a case, 233MC /P3lia cir tmf C /P3D

suicide terrorism, and perhaps one tenth of one percent (1.000/1.000000) know something about or are involved in jihadist activity in the U.K.

The characterization “Activists” in the pyramid model might be accompanied by a question mark on the left side of the pyramid, opposite the right-side levels that range from Neutral to Radical. The question mark and separate location would represent an important uncertainty about political activism, which we understand as legal and non-violent political protest or political action. It is beyond the scope of the present article to explore whether or how often activism leads to radicalization, that is, how often legal and non-violent political action leads on to illegal and violent political action. We expect that the answer will differ for different groups, different decades, and different cultures.

Note also that the pyramid does not imply a stage theory, which would require that every trajectory to terrorism must start at the base of the pyramid and rise through each intervening level in order to reach terrorism at the apex.[24] Note that, in the pyramid model, the volcanic “magma pipe” of radicals/terrorists reaches down even into the neutral population. This representation recognizes that even apolitical individuals at the base of the pyramid can sometimes shift more or less rapidly to political violence and terrorism.

Indeed analyses have suggested that the pathways to terrorism are varied and complex.[25] Recent work suggests that there are plural pathways with no particular trajectory.[26] The next section discusses some of the sources of these pathways.

Mechanisms of Radicalization and the Importance of the Narrative

Insofar as jihadi radicalization is concerned, four types of popular explanations can be found:

1. Socio-economic marginalization. This is the prevailing neo-Marxist explanation that assumes economic factors underlying all conflicts everywhere at all times. People are frustrated because they are poor or otherwise victimized by the economic and social system.

2. Social-identity marginalization. This explanation holds that people have trouble integrating culturally into the mainstream of society or encounter difficulties in having their own identity recognized and validated by the mainstream.

3. Religious fanaticism. This explanation is favoured by those who see Wahhabism and Salafism as the crux of the problem. In this account, extremist religion is the ‘center of gravity.’

4. Political grievance. From this perspective, the major source of the problem are people who are unhappy with certain political decisions or policies which they seek to change.

It is worth noting that the four explanations are all sub-species of grievance; each presumes something wrong with the world that needs to be changed. From a comparative perspective, the important fact to note is that the vast majority of people that might fall into any of those four categories are not violent, indeed do not advocate, support, or even sympathize with violence. For this reason and for our purposes then, all four are of limited utility.

A more differentiated system of explanation has recently been offered by McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). They distinguish among individual, group, and mass-public mechanisms of radicalization. Their focus is specifically on radicalization that leads to the extreme of political violence.

1. Personal grievance. Harm to self or loved ones produces anger toward the perpetrators. This explanation includes individual experience of socio-economic or identity frustration, but includes

1.One narrative must counter the perception that the West is engaged in a War on Islam. This perception is accepted by a very broad cross-section of Muslims, perhaps still more than half of Muslims worldwide even after the inauguration of President Obama. So long as Western troops are deployed in Muslim countries, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan, a counter-narrative for the War on Islam will likely remain difficult to formulate.

2.A second narrative must counter the perception that Muslim terrorists are defending Islam. While the aforementioned polls in Muslim countries suggest a reservoir of personal admiration for Osama bin Laden, most respondents do not endorse terrorism as a legitimate means.

3.A third narrative must counter the perception that the actions of Muslim terrorists, especially attacks on Western civilians and collateral damage to Muslim civilians, are legitimate acts of war. Polls indicate that only a small percentage of Muslims believe this, although amounting to large numbers of potential extremists in absolute terms. Research will be needed to identify the characteristics of this small but very important minority.

4. Finally, a fourth narrative must counter the perception that good Muslims have a duty to support the terrorists. As far as we are aware, there are no polls that have assessed how many or what kind of Muslims agree with this view. We expect that the percentage is very small but one representing a very high level of radicalization. Targeting this tiny minority with any kind of mass media intervention may be difficult indeed.

Without detracting from Olson's claim that (1) "we have not adapted our planning structures to the new information-dominated operational environment"[31] and from the claim that (2) "we do not focus enough effort on winning and maintaining the hearts and minds of the most critical and accessible population: our own," and that (3) "we struggle to be persuasive in the virtual dimension because the message that we wish to convey lacks narrative coherence," it is not a matter, as David Betts has eloquently argued, of developing a coherent and strategic narrative.[32] Nor is it a matter, as posited by Frank Douglas, of making the idea of violent jihad widely unpopular.[33] It is already widely unpopular, even among its supposed target audience! Rather, it is a matter of developing multiple counter-narratives that are tailored to specific audiences. This finding echoes General Sir Rupert Smith's observation that "we are living in a world of confrontations and conflict rather than one of war and peace."[34]

This article has been motivated by a concern that the West is targeting the wrong people and for the wrong reasons. Radical ideas are not the problem per se. After all, many of democracies' greatest advances have been the result of "radicals" propagating "radical ideas." Democratic governments are not (or, at least, ought not be) in the business of policing what people think or believe. Thoughts and beliefs are (or ought to be) of concern only insofar as they are linked to behaviour that is illegal. Even then, however, it is important to distinguish between non-violent and violent illegal conduct. Only the latter is (or ought to be) of genuine concern to security and intelligence forces. Therefore, the counter-narrative task is a narrow one: to counter those narratives with the clearest link to violence.

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[28] Marc Sageman. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.
[29] David Beresford. Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike. Grove/Atlantic, 1997.
[30] Andrew Silke. "Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Process of Jihadi Radicalization." European Journal of Criminology, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2008, pp. 99-123.
[31] See also William J. Olson. "War Without a Centre of Gravity: Reflections on Terrorism and Post-Modern War." Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2007, pp. 559-583.
[32] Betts, op. cit.
[33] Frank "Scott" Douglas. "Waging the inchoate war: Defining, fighting, and second-guessing the 'Long War'." Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2007, pp. 391-420.
[34] Rupert Smith. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, 2005, pp. 16-18, 371-372.

Ana S. Trbovich. A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. 522 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-533343-5

Beginning in 1991, the state of Yugoslavia disintegrated like an accidentally dropped crystal. Yet according to Ana S. Trbovich, it was hardly an unforeseen and indeed, an unforeseeable occurrence. Its seeds were sown in the historical apportionment of various provinces, which bore the names of ethnic groups (except for the Muslims) but had little to do with the patterns of actual demographic composition within these geographical entities. She points out that the internal boundaries of Yugoslavia were only the administrative needs of the Communist government; these did not pertain to any territorial claims of the Slovenes, the Croats, the Serbs and the Muslims (who claimed Bosnia-Herzegovina). As a result, each group felt compelled to drive out the "intruders" by a process, which became enshrined in history of the twentieth century under the euphemistic name of "ethnic cleansing."

Nationalism, the process by which a group of people see themselves as part of a larger collectivity, separated from the "others," was largely a product of nineteenth century Europe. From the beginning, the principle of (and later right to) self-determination and political separation came directly into conflict with the sovereign need of the state to maintain its territorial integrity. Although Trbovich frames this dilemma in terms of the former Yugoslavia, her analysis is eminently pertinent for our understanding of other conflicts - from Uighur nationalism to the Basque rebellion, from Kashmir to Georgia.

However, in the quest for international political stability, the post WWII practice in the United Nations, with the possible exception of Bangladesh and East Timor, has been to side squarely on the side of state sovereignty. Trbovich poignantly points out that "(i)n the case of Yugoslavia, the fundamental principle of territorial integrity, which lies at the basis of international law, appears to have been undermined" (p. 1). On the basis of a great deal of legal and historical research, the author constructs her case in favour of state sovereignty and warns us against the romantic notion of ancestral community and a common bond of blood and culture – notions which psychologically separate a group from everyone else within a larger political entity.

While Trbovich builds an impressive set of arguments based on international law and a painstaking discussion of various treaties and plans, she generally shies away from answering her own core question adequately: why did the international community break its own rule in the case of the Yugoslav republics which "rendered human and minority rights the only form of determination" (p. 436)? It would have been interesting to place it in the broader context of international politics, the discussion of which is somewhat inadequate in the treatment of her own Balkan case study. Had she done so, we would have understood better the reasons why, along with Yugoslavia, Bangladesh and East Timor stand out as exceptions to standard UN practices. It could also have shed important light on the West's concern about genocide in Darfur as opposed to the one in Rwanda. Equally absent in her discussion is the question of the formation of individual ethnic identity, which was used to romanticize each community while demonizing others. Tito, on the one hand, tried to develop a Yugoslav national identity, yet, on the other hand, created at the same time a political structure which could only promote sectarianism.

Much of this unfortunate process can be traced to successive amendments to the Yugoslav Constitution, which almost guaranteed conflict among various groups. Trbovich comments that "(i)n addition to escalating nationalism, the reason for creating such an ambiguous, contradictory, and ineffective constitutional arrangement for Yugoslavia was the so-called inheritance question or the problem of Tito's succession. Tito safeguarded his power so strongly, that he fashioned a system in which any resolution among the republics called for his personal intervention" (p. 165). Unfortunately, while presenting the



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